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We investigate the behavior of farmers who share an underground aquifer. In the case
where seepage may occur the resource is nonexclusive, giving rise to a spatial
externality whereby pumping by one user affects others nearby. Theoretically, these
externalities are potentially important causes of welfare loss. Using a unique spatial
data set of groundwater users in western Kansas, we are able to empirically measure
the physical and behavioral effects of groundwater pumping by neighbors. To address
the simultaneity of neighbors’ pumping, we use the neighbors’ permitted water
allocation as an instrument for their pumping. We estimate that 2.5% of the total
groundwater extracted each year in western Kansas is over-extraction due to the effects
of spatial externalities. Individuals who own multiple wells internalize their own
externality by trading off pumping at one well for pumping at another.
& 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Property rights to the land overlying groundwater aquifers prevent ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’-type free entry and the
resulting over-exploitation commonly associated with common property resources. However, the fugitive nature of
groundwater may create a spatial externality whereby the holder of groundwater rights cannot fully capture the water
beneath his land. Seepage, caused by hydrologic gradients and ‘‘cones of depression’’ from pumping, renders groundwater
a partially non-exclusive resource [32]. Pumping by users of the same aquifer may lower the water table, increase cost of
extraction, and decrease the stock of water available for other users. This non-exclusivity dampens or eliminates an
individual’s incentive to forego current for future pumping, resulting in an increased rate of extraction and more rapid
resource depletion [29,27,22].
The extent of the spatial externalities resulting from groundwater pumping from shared aquifers has been rather
contentiously debated since the 1970s, when physical scientists began to note rapidly falling water tables in heavily
irrigated agricultural basins. While some assert that the difference between an optimal control aquifer management
solution and the competitive outcome is not large enough to justify the use of costly management measures (for example,
[15,14,35]), others maintain that the difference can be substantial, and that the over-extraction occurring in many of the
world’s aquifer basins is evidence of externality-induced over-exploitation (for example, [2,8,20,29]). Recently, economists
have begun incorporating more realistic hydrological assumptions into their models, moving away from the ‘‘bathtub’’
model of an aquifer that assumes water withdrawn by one user lowers the water table instantly and uniformly throughout
the entire aquifer [36,6]. These models have imparted additional insight on the problem, particularly the spatial
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heterogeneity of the externality, but they generally rely on parametrized mathematical programming and simulation
models to predict the effect of pumping on neighboring users. We have very little knowledge of the empirical magnitude of
these externalities, whether they are large enough to affect groundwater users, or whether users respond by increasing
their own pumping rates as predicted by theoretical models.
The objective of this paper is to empirically estimate the magnitude and extent of interactions, through extraction
behavior, between neighboring groundwater users. The actual behavioral response may not be proportional to the
response predicted from a physical-hydrological model; there is considerable uncertainty about groundwater ﬂows,
especially by farmers who may not have specialized knowledge in hydrology. Users may over-react, or they may ignore or
be unaware of actual groundwater ﬂows. For this reason, an empirical behavioral response model may be more valuable
than a detailed hydrological model. In this paper, individual well-level data from irrigators in western Kansas are used to
econometrically determine whether the pumping of neighbors affects the groundwater extraction decision. The
estimations take advantage of detailed spatial data on groundwater pumping from the portion of the High Plains Aquifer
system that underlies western Kansas.
Measuring interactions between neighbors is complicated by simultaneity-induced endogeneity (individuals affect
their neighbors and their neighbors simultaneously affect them) [24,16,34,23]; we use an instrumental variables approach
to purge neighbors’ decisions of this endogenous component. Groundwater users in Kansas extract water under the
doctrine of prior appropriation. In Kansas this means that a permit specifying the maximum annual extraction limit,
beneﬁcial use requirements, and a date deﬁning new permits as ‘‘junior’’ relative to others must be obtained from the state
Division of Water Resources [31]. The permit amount, while generally non-binding, is a strong determinant of actual
pumping but is uncorrelated with the pumping of neighbors whose pumping is determined by their own permit.
Therefore, we use this permit amount as an instrument for neighbors’ pumping. In addition, the instrument is weighted by
a function of the distance between each neighbor that takes into account the way in which water moves through an
aquifer. Thus, this instrumental variables approach models the spatial connectivity between users, as well as corrects for
the simultaneity of neighbors’ pumping decisions.
This is the ﬁrst study to empirically measure economic relationships between groundwater users. We ﬁnd strong
evidence of spatial externalities between neighboring groundwater users that result in increased pumping. The results are
further strengthened by the ﬁnding that the externality is internalized by users who own multiple wells, i.e., there is no
change in behavior caused by pumping from nearby wells owned by the same user. The magnitude of the externality,
however, is small. We estimate that 2.5% of the groundwater extracted in western Kansas is over-extraction due to the
effect of spatial externalities. It is important to note that the results are highly dependent on the hydrological conditions of
the aquifer under study. Areas with greater rates of hydroconductivity, different property rights regimes, or wells that are
spaced more closely, for example, could be much more affected by spatial externalities. The methods presented here could
be used to estimate them.
2. Background
The High Plains Aquifer system underlies 174,000 square miles and portions of eight midwestern states. Ninety-nine
percent of the approximately 21 million acre-feet of water withdrawn from the High Plains aquifer annually is used for
irrigation. Declines in the water table have been measured since intensive irrigation became widespread in the 1970s. The
largest declines (up to 150 ft) have occurred in parts of southwestern Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. ‘‘Aquifer
sustainability’’ is a popular political and environmental talking point, although rather irrelevant given rates of recharge
that are extremely small in most of the aquifer (excluding some regions underlying Nebraska). The aquifer was formed 2 to
6 million years ago, and should be thought of as essentially non-renewable [25].
While sustainability (in the sense of a steady-state rate of extraction that is equal to recharge) is unrealistic in most
parts of the aquifer, public concerns about over-extraction and too-rapid resource depletion have received signiﬁcant
scientiﬁc attention. The early economic models of aquifer exploitation assumed open access and complete rent dissipation
in the absence of regulation [15,12,28].1 They compared this with the opposite extreme of a single owner extracting from a
single well to obtain the welfare maximizing rate of extraction [9]. Gisser and Sanchez’s [15] ﬁndings that the welfare
gains to optimal management were negligible (in the Pecos Basin of New Mexico, where their computable model was
parameterized) sparked decades of research (see [20], for a review). Subsequent studies explored how changes in the
discount rate, increases in demand or technology adoption over time, property rights, and strategic interactions between
users might affect the gains from management [29,21,12,14,32,33,3,27,35]. In general, estimates of the quantitative
difference between the competitive (or myopic) and the socially optimal solution remained low, from negligible to around
16%, resulting in little economic rationale for costly public groundwater management.
Brozovic et al. [5] and Saak and Peterson [36] point out that these models ignore the most basic of hydrological rules.
They employ a ‘‘bathtub’’ model of an aquifer, which assumes instantaneous lateral ﬂow of water. Extraction by one user
lowers the water table in the next period for all other users by an equal amount, regardless of their spatial distribution.
1
Negri [27] shows that even without free entry, rent is dissipated to l=N, the shadow value of the stock of water divided by the number of users.
Rent approaches zero as the number of landowners becomes large.
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This results in a homogenous depth to groundwater for the entire aquifer and the assumption that the spatial distribution
of wells does not matter [6]. In reality, however, water in an aquifer is contained by rock, sand, and gravel, slowing lateral
movement, or hydroconductivity. A non-inﬁnite rate of hydroconductivity both limits the spatial extent to which one user
can affect another, and increases the potential impact of pumping on neighbors within that extent. Pumping results in a
cone of depression around each well by creating a gradient between the water table in the well and the water table outside
of it. The size of the cone of depression depends on many hydrological factors. The depth to water (known as head height),
the distance from the aquifer bed to the water table (saturated thickness), and the speed of lateral movement
(hydroconductivity or transmissivity) vary considerably even within an aquifer. When cones of depression overlap, they
have a combined effect on water levels. When water extraction is seasonal, cones of depression will equilibriate over the
non-pumping season to an extent governed by the hydrological characteristics of the aquifer. Pumpers can be affected by
their neighbors’ pumping through overlapping cones of depression within a pumping season, and by the intra-seasonal
equilibriation of water levels during the non-pumping season.2 In both cases, withdrawal by one user lowers the water
table and increases the future pumping costs for neighboring users, shifting the intertemporal depletion path toward the
present [27]. Negri [27] and Provencher and Burt [32] identify another source of inefﬁciency. When property rights do not
identify the precise amount of water owned by a user, water that is not withdrawn can potentially be captured by
neighboring users. This undermines the incentive to store groundwater as a stock, and further shifts the extraction path
toward the present [10]. Intuitively, it is in a pumper’s interest to keep his water table lower than his neighbors to prevent
out-ﬂow. Such ﬂow, however, is governed by hydrology.
Clearly, it is important to incorporate the hydrological rules governing the movement of groundwater in a model of
spatial externalities, as groundwater movement is the source of the externality. Brozovic et al. [6] found that when
groundwater is modeled as a spatially explicit resource using hydrologically realistic equations of motion, the effect of the
externality may be orders of magnitude larger than if estimated using a bathtub model, especially for large and unconﬁned
aquifers like the High Plains system.
Groundwater in Kansas is governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation. Prior appropriation implies ‘‘ﬁrst in time,
ﬁrst in right’’, or that junior (more recent) rightsholders may be required to cede their extraction rights to senior
rightsholders in times of scarcity [31]. Instead of directly applying this implication, however, the state has developed a
variety of additional institutions and regulations to more clearly deﬁne the speciﬁcs of a water right. In particular, the state
of Kansas administers groundwater rights through a system of permits. A potential groundwater user must apply for a
permit, which if granted, speciﬁes an annual pumping limit and the location of the ﬁeld to which it must be applied. This
permit has a date attached to it, deﬁning the seniority of the right (should the doctrine of prior appropriation be
employed). Through the 1970s, the period of intensive agricultural development in Kansas, groundwater pumping permits
were granted to nearly anyone who requested them. Some permits are as old as 1945, but the majority (about 75%) were
allocated between 1963 and 1981. Beginning in the 1970s, however, concern that the aquifer was over-appropriated began
to grow. This led to a variety of rules designed to minimize interference between users. Kansas created ﬁve Groundwater
Management Districts (GMD) that currently regulate irrigation well spacing and prohibit new water extraction within a
designated radius of existing wells. Well spacing requirements are allowed to vary by extraction rate, annual extraction,
characteristics of the aquifer from which it the water is drawn, and GMD.3 For most high volume irrigation wells,
minimum well spacing is around half a mile. By encouraging spatially heterogeneous well-spacing regulation for new
wells, the state is acknowledging that spatial externalities in groundwater exist and potentially cause interference
between neighboring users. The regulations apply only for new extraction permits, increase in annual allocation, or
increases in ﬂow rates, however, and do not affect existing wells or permits.
In addition, GMDs are allowed to designate Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCA), whereby special
regulations can be used in areas determined to ‘‘warrant additional regulation to protect the public interest’’. IGUCAs allow
nuanced regulation to be applied to particular areas determined to have groundwater overextraction, quality, or other
problems. Eight such areas have been designated since 1978; in some cases no action for existing extractors was required,
and in only two were existing appropriations affected [30].4 The Division of Water Resources has never ordered the strict
enforcement of prior appropriation, which would shut down junior users in favor of senior rightsholders.
It is common for users to extract less than their full appropriation of groundwater. Precipitation, crop choice, and the
cost of energy affect how much water an irrigator extracts in a given year. Very few users extract all of their allocation, and
an average of 85% of users extract less than 90% of their total allocation per year.5 Only about 2% of users extract more
than their annual allocation, even though prior to 2004, there was no ofﬁcial penalty for over-pumping or enforcement of
2

In western Kansas, the pumping season is generally from June through September, and water levels equilibriate over the winter.
See the Rules and Regulations for individual GMDs: http://www.ksda.gov/appropriation/content/295.
Reasons that an area may be determined an IGUCA include groundwater levels declining excessively, the rate of groundwater withdrawal
exceeding the rate of groundwater recharge, or an unreasonable deterioration of groundwater quality has occurred or may occur. For more information
including a map of the IGUCAs, see the Kansas Department of Agriculture, http://www.ksda.gov/appropriation/content/291. In only one case (the Walnut
Creek IGUCA) was there differentiation between the actions required by senior and junior rightsholders.
5
The actual proportion of users extracting less than 90% of their total allocation is higher than 85%. The available data on water rights allocation are
current, not historical. Thus, while we are using the extraction data from 1996 to 2005, we must use the rights information from when the data was
accessed (2008). While observed pumping for a given user in, for example, 1996, may be higher than their allocation amount in the records in 2008, their
allocation may have been higher in 1996. Several voluntary appropriation reduction programs were in place over the time period, and we do not have a
3
4

L. Pfeiffer, C.-Y.C. Lin / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64 (2012) 16–30

19

pumping limits.6 Thus, there is signiﬁcant room for adjustment to the effects of external factors including the pumping
decisions of neighbors, especially in the time period that we consider.

3. Theory and model
While the objective of this paper is empirical, a brief, simple theoretical model is developed to generate and illustrate
testable hypotheses. We compare the ﬁrst order conditions generated from a social planner/single owner groundwater
management problem with those obtained from an individual’s extraction problem. While we do not purport that a ‘‘social
planner’’ solution is realistically obtainable given the complexity of the groundwater basin, we expect the case in which a
single owner manages multiple wells in an area to approach the social planner solution. In other words, we expect spatial
externalities that occur between wells to be internalized when one individual is the single owner of multiple wells.

3.1. The hydrological system
We abstract from a true hydrological model because the nature of our data only allows the estimation of spatial
externalities between years, not within. Thus, we are not attempting to measure the extent of the overlap between the
cones of depression caused by pumping within a season. Instead, and by necessity given annual data, we will estimate the
extent and effect of the equilibriation of water levels between seasons.
The equation of motion for groundwater stock is derived from simpliﬁed hydrological mass-balance equations, and
assumes that the land owned by each farmer can be thought of as a ‘‘patch’’ with a uniform stock of water beneath each
farm. Water ﬂows between patches according to hydrological rules. This is a simpliﬁcation of the true physical nature of
groundwater ﬂows [13], but is appropriate given our objective of modeling groundwater ﬂows between seasons and a
notable improvement on the bathtub aquifer model used in previous theoretical work [27,32]. Similar assumptions have
been used for the between-period movement of ﬁsh stocks [19,37]. The equation of motion describing the change in stock
over time, s_i , is:
X
s_i ¼ wi þ g i ðwi Þ þ
yji sj :
ð1Þ
j2I

The change in groundwater stock depends on the amount agent i is pumping, wi, and the amount of recharge to patch i,
g i ðwi Þ. Recharge is a function of return ﬂow, and @g i =@wi Z 0.
s_i also depends on the net ﬂow into i’s land that is caused by physical height gradients and other hydrological factors
that determine how water ﬂows within an aquifer. yij is deﬁned as the share of the water in the aquifer that starts in patch
P
i and disperses to patch j by the next period, so j2I yji sj is the net amount of water that ﬂows into patch i from all other
patches in the system. Groundwater ﬂow is generally stock dependent; net ﬂow is a function of the stocks of water in all
the other patches, so yji ðs1 ,s2 , . . . ,sI Þ and @yji =@si r0. A simple yet hydrologically reasonable functional form assumption for
net ﬂow can be derived from Darcy’s Law for water movement through a porous material and is an example of yji : the
dispersal of water between patches depends on the physical gradients between patches, ðsj si Þ=xji , and the transmissivity
of the material holding the water, commonly called k [7]. In this simple model, the net ﬂow into patch i is kj ðsj si Þ=xji ,
where xji is the distance between plot i and j. yji could also be more complex and consider the effects of aquifer bed
topology, continuous cones of depression from pumping, or saltwater intrusion, for example [19].
In a long-run equilibrium without pumping and with a homogeneous aquifer bed, si ¼ sj , 8i,j; the groundwater stocks
under all land patches will be equal.

3.2. The single owner/social welfare maximizer’s problem
To set the socially optimal rate of extraction benchmark, consider a single owner or social planner who must make
pumping decisions for an entire aquifer basin, upon which lie many plots of land with groundwater pumps. Revenue
earned on each plot i, Ri ðwi Þ, depends on how much water he extracts from the aquifer to irrigate crops, and cost C is
dependent both on the amount extracted and the stock available, si. The smaller the stock, the greater the distance through
which the water must be pumped to reach the surface, so @C i ðsi Þ=@si o0. The planner seeks to maximize the present value
(footnote continued)
way of knowing the exact amount of the appropriation contract in each year. We do know, however, that it could not have increased over the period, and
that for the most part it is constant.
6
Speciﬁc penalties for overextraction violations were added to the Kansas Water Appropriation Act in the fall of 2003 (KAR 5-14-10). However,
enforcement only recently became common; signiﬁcant resources were not directed toward enforcement until 2008. Penalties increase with the number
of violations; the ﬁrst offence incurs only a warning. Penalties are described on the Kansas Department of Agriculture website: http://www.ksda.gov/
appropriation/cid/1554.
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of aggregate proﬁt by planning for this aquifer basin (assuming there is no ﬂow in or out of the aquifer):
"
#
Z 1
I
X
rt
max
e
ðRi ðwi ÞCðsi Þwi Þ dt,
fwi ðtÞgIi ¼

1

0

ð2Þ

i¼1

where the planner chooses the set of pumping volumes on each plot of land in each time period, fwi ðtÞg. The owner
P
optimizes subject to the equation of motion for the water stock under each plot s_i ¼ wi þg i ðwi Þ þ j2I yji sj , i¼1,y,I and
rt
the transversality condition limt-1 e lit sit ¼ 0, i ¼ 1, . . . ,I.
In this formulation the planner is pumping water from each plot for use on that plot’s crops.7 The planner will consider
each plot’s shadow value of a unit of groundwater stock when determining the optimal solution, so as to internalize any
externality that could occur.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the current value Hamiltonian Hðw1 , . . . ,wI ,s1 , . . . ,sI , l1 , . . . , lI Þ are
@Ri
@g
¼ Cðsi Þ þ li li i ,
@wi
@wi

ð3Þ

0
1
!
I
X
X @yji
X
@yij
@C
ðs
Þ
i
i
þ li @yii þ
sj A þ
lj yij þ
si :
r li l_ i ¼ wi
@si
@si
@si
j2I
j2I
i¼1

ð4Þ

jai

The planner will choose the crop–water combination such that the value marginal product of the water is equal to the
marginal pumping cost plus the shadow value of water. The shadow value is a function of the ﬂow onto and off of the
farmer’s plot. The social optimum is a function of the water stock on all the parcels of land under the owner’s control, all of
the interconnections between parcels, and all of the shadow values. It is possible, given heterogeneous costs or revenue
across plots i, that interior solutions will not be optimal for all plots (i.e., optimal pumping may be zero in some plots).
This program is identical to the single owner/social planner problem normally analyzed using a bathtub aquifer model
if we assume that transmissivity is inﬁnite, the aquifer is parallel sided and ﬂat bottomed, return ﬂow is zero, and parcels
are perfectly homogeneous [27]. It does not matter where the wells are located or how many there are, as long as water
can be transported costlessly to the entire surface of the parcel. If we make these assumptions, the ﬁrst order condition (4)
can be summed over all the parcels and collapses to l_ ¼ r l þ Nw@CðsÞ=@s, where N is the total number of parcels the planner
controls, and w is the total amount of water withdrawn per parcel. By integrating, using the transversality condition, and
combining the ﬁrst order conditions, the marginal condition for an arbitrary t is obtained:
Z 1
@R
@CðsÞ
¼ CðsÞ þ N
dt:
ð5Þ
erðtt Þ w
@w
@s
t
To be intertemporally efﬁcient, a landowner will extract water until the marginal value product of water is equal to the
marginal cost of extraction plus the value of the marginal unit of water as stock, which is the deﬁnition of the shadow price
l. The marginal unit left as stock has value because it reduces future pumping costs. This is the standard Hotelling solution,
where the shadow value grows as a function of the rate of interest [17].
3.3. Individual, dynamically optimizing farmer
Now compare the social planner’s solution to the solution of a group of individual landowners, each having property
rights to one ‘‘patch’’, that partially share the water resource. The objective function faced by one of these farmers is:
Z 1
max
ert ½Ri ðwi ÞCðsi Þwi  dt,
ð6Þ
wi ðtÞ

0

with the equation of motion as in Eq. (1) and transversality condition limt-1 lit sit ¼ 0. This problem is similar to that that
posed in Janmaat [19], but dissimilar to much of the previous literature on spatial ﬁsheries, in that each parcel is owned by
an individual with no claim on the proﬁt earned in any other parcel.
The ﬁrst order conditions derived from the maximization of the Hamiltonian can be combined and then integrated to
obtain the marginal condition for an arbitrary t:

Z 1
P
@Ri
@g
@C ðs Þ
ðryii 
ð@yji =@si Þsj Þðtt Þ
j2I
¼ Cðsi Þ þ 1 i
e
wi i i dt:
ð7Þ
@si
@wi
@wi
t
The necessary condition for intertemporal optimization shows that water is extracted until marginal proﬁts are equal to
marginal extraction costs plus the present value of the shadow value of water. A unit of groundwater left in the aquifer has
value only in proportion to the amount that the owner can capture in the future. Stock dependent net ﬂow implies
P
P
j2I @yji =@si o 0, and the
j2I @yji =@si term captures the extent to which the resource is common. As this term gets larger,
7
This is in contrast to the single owner/social planner depicted in Negri [27] in which the planner controls the entire swath of land, pumps from only
one location, and then presumably distributes it to the spatial location where it is needed.
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Fig. 1. Relationship between owners i and j in terms of depth to groundwater.

less of the water left as stock can be captured by the owner of the land, effectively increasing the discount rate and
decreasing the value of the marginal unit of stock. This shifts the extraction path towards the present.
Higher values of @g i =@wi , the function describing recharge and return ﬂow, decrease the value of the marginal unit of
groundwater as stock and increase present period pumping.
Empirically, we expect the effect of neighbors’ pumping to be positive regardless of the sign of the gradient, i.e.,
regardless of whether i’s stock of water is greater than j’s, or vice versa. Consider the ways in which stock of water affects
the user’s optimization problem. First, it affects their marginal cost of extraction. Second, it affects the ﬂow into and out of
a user’s plot. In part (a) of Fig. 1, individual i faces a larger stock, or equivalently a shorter depth to the water table than
does j. Due to the negative gravitational gradient, water will ﬂow out of i’s plot, decreasing i’s shadow value of water. To
capture the water before it can ﬂow out and extract it at a lower marginal cost, i would increase pumping.
In part (b) of Fig. 1, the gravitational gradient is positive, causing water from j to ﬂow to i. This reduces the effect of
current period pumping on future pumping by decreasing i’s future marginal cost of extraction. Thus, current period
pumping would increase. The linkage between users causes each individual to marginally increase pumping, regardless of
who is ‘‘uphill’’ from whom. Anything that increases the linkage between patches will also increase present period
pumping, including a greater hydroconductivity, a smaller distance between wells, and higher pumping by neighboring
patch owners.
Finally, the solution to the individual’s dynamic optimization problem leads to greater extraction than would occur
under a single owner, as long as yii a1. yii describes the proportion of water starting in patch i that stays in patch i the
following period. If all of the water that starts in i stays in i, for all i, then there is no lateral ﬂow in the aquifer and the
derivatives @yji =@si and @yij =@si are zero. Consider ﬁrst order conditions (4) and (7). In (7), the interest rate is decreased by
P
the sum of the net ﬂow derivatives
j2I sj ð@yji =@si Þ, and with stock dependent ﬂow, this sum is negative, effectively
increasing the interest rate. In the central planner’s ﬁrst order condition (4), the interest rate is further adjusted by the
derivatives of ﬂow going from i to j. Given stock dependent ﬂow, @yij =@si Z 0; an increase in the stock level at i will cause
P
P
more movement out of patch i to other patches. Thus, as long as j2I @yij =@si 40, it will negate the effect of j2I @yji =@si and
the total amount of water withdrawn per period by the social planner will be less than the total amount of water
withdrawn by all of the individuals.
This model leads to several testable hypotheses. First, we empirically estimate the equation of motion. We measure the
effect that a farmer has on his own depth to groundwater at his own well. We also measure the effect that pumping by a
farmer’s neighbors has on the depth to groundwater at his own well. For purely physical reasons, we expect own pumping
to have a greater effect on the depth to groundwater than pumping by neighbors has. Second, we test if pumping by a
jai

22

L. Pfeiffer, C.-Y.C. Lin / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64 (2012) 16–30

farmer’s neighbors has an effect on the pumping behavior of that farmer. The theoretical model shows that extraction by
neighbors should increase pumping. Finally, by comparing the ﬁrst order conditions of the individual’s optimization
problem with those of the social planners, we hypothesize that if a farmer owns multiple wells in adjoining parcels, he will
manage them differently than if each well were owned by a different person. Speciﬁcally, we can test whether any effect of
pumping from his own wells (on water table height or pumping) is less than the effect of pumping from wells owned by
others.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Data
A unique data set allows the empirical exploration of these hypotheses. Kansas has required the reporting of
groundwater pumping by water rightsholders since the 1940s, although data from 1996 to the present are considered
to be complete and reliable. The data are available from the Water Information Management and Analysis System
(WIMAS).8 Included are spatially referenced pumping data at the source (well or pump) level, and each data point has the
farmer, ﬁeld, irrigation technology, amount pumped, and crops grown identiﬁed. A sample of the data is used for the
analysis that includes only one well per water rights owner.9 There are about 6000 sampled points of diversion for each of
the 10 years from 1996 to 2005. These are combined with spatial data sets of recharge, water bodies, and other geographic
information.
The United States Geological Survey’s High Plains Water-Level Monitoring Study maintains a network of nearly 10,000
monitoring wells. Data from these wells have been used to estimate yearly water levels. The USGS also provides spatial
data on speciﬁc yield and transmissivity of the aquifer, and rainfall data are obtained from the PRISM Group at Oregon
State University.10 Relevant information from the geographic ﬁles was captured at the points of diversion (well) level using
ArcGIS.
Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Tables 1 and 2. An average of 144 acre-ft of
water are extracted per irrigation well per year. Many irrigators own multiple wells, and pump an average of 1200 acre-ft
in total. Each well irrigates an average of 137 acres, and each well owner irrigates an average of 943 acres. The average
depth to groundwater is 114 ft, but ranges from 0.8 to over 350 ft. The average change in the depth to groundwater from
one year to the next is one foot. Over the ten year period, each point of diversion received an average of 22 in of
precipitation per year. Recharge, hydroconductivity, and soil characteristics are time-invariant and are estimated by the
United States Geological Survey and evaluated at each point of diversion. Recharge to the Kansas portion of the High Plains
Aquifer is low; average recharge is 1.4 in. The mean hydroconductivity is 65.8 ft per day.
Three measures of soil quality are used in the analysis. Irrigated capability class is a categorical variable describing the
suitability of the soil for irrigated crops; the ﬁrst category being the most suitable. The fourty-ﬁve percent of the plots have
soils in category 1, and we use an indicator variable equal to one if the soil is in category 1, and zero otherwise. The average
available water capacity is 0.18 cm/cm, and the mean slope (as a percent of distance) is 1.1%.
A variety of spatial neighborhood variables are constructed to investigate the effect of neighbors’ pumping. Summary
statistics are provided in Table 2. A half mile, one, two, three, and four mile radius around each well is constructed and the
average number of neighboring wells, and the number of acre-feet of groundwater extracted from those neighboring wells
is included in the table of summary statistics. Weighted gradients, calculated as the difference in water table height
between two wells, divided by the distance and multiplied by hydroconductivity, are used to weight the amount of water
pumped by neighbors by the impact they should have. To obtain average marginal effects, the estimated coefﬁcient must
be multiplied by the average weight; we provide the average weights in Table 2.
4.2. Empirical estimation strategy
4.2.1. Estimation of the equation of motion
Using the data from Kansas, we can directly estimate the equation of motion and test the effect of pumping on the
change in groundwater stock from one year to the next. The stock of groundwater can be equivalently measured as lift
height, or the distance from the ground surface to the top of the water table. Because our data contain information on
static levels (the top of the groundwater table measured in winter, presumably after equilibrating from the pumping
season), we use this as a measure of stock. Given the assumptions of the equation of motion, the change in the depth to
8

http://hercules.kgs.ku.edu/geohydro/wimas/
The data set includes information on all groundwater wells in Kansas. We use only one well per water rights owner for the analysis because when
we construct the spatial neighborhoods (described in the last paragraph in this section), we want to differentiate between wells owned by others and
wells owned by the same person. The tools available in ArcGIS do not allow us to identify the water rights owner when constructing the spatial
neighborhoods, and because of the size of the data set, it would be impractical to do by hand. Therefore, we include only one well per owner in the
analyzed data set, but add up his other wells and amount pumped to use as an explanatory variable.
10
PRISM (Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model) data sets are recognized world-wide as the highest-quality spatial climate
data sets currently available. http://www.prism.oregonstate.edu/
9
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Table 1
Summary Statistics, 1996–2005.
Individual-year level variables

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Acre-feet pumped, single well
Acre-feet pumped, single water rights owner
Acres planted on irrigable land, single well
Acres planted on irrigable land, single water rights owner
Depth to groundwater (ft)
Change in depth to groundwater (ft)
Change in depth to groundwater, county average (ft)
Precipitation (in)

58,531
58,531
58,531
58,531
58,531
58,531
459
58,531

144.4
1217.4
137.3
943.1
114.3
1.2
1.0
22.3

120.1
4212.1
84.7
2653.5
76.1
14.6
8.2
5.8

6312
6312
6312
6312
6312
6312

1.4
65.8
1.1
0.5
0.2
0.7

Individual level variables
Recharge (in)
Hydroconductivity (ft/day)
Slope (% of distance)
Irrigated Capability Class
Available water capacity (cm/cm)
Distance to nearest neighbor (mile)

1.3
75.2
0.9
0.5
0.03
0.5

Table 2
Summary statistics of spatial neighborhood variables.
Neighborhood size

Number of neighboring wells

Acre-feet pumped

Average gradient weight

0.5 mile radius

0.06
(0.24)
0.49
(0.78)
3.44
(2.54)
9.61
(5.72)
17.51
(9.16)

46.70
(103.75)
239.12
(274.26)
977.05
(805.35)
2118.09
(1611.79)
3520.91
(2510.62)

75.45
(148.09)
46.80
(85.43)
24.03
(43.97)
15.89
(28.91)
14.37
(25.78)

1 mile radius
2 mile radius
3 mile radius
4 mile radius

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

groundwater should depend on the amount that is pumped at the location where the depth is measured (own pumping),
the amount pumped by neighbors, the distance between the farms, the relative heights of the water tables, and the
transmissivity of the aquifer at that location. Models of the form
hit þ 1 hit ¼ b0 þ b1 wit þ b2 wjt þX0it b3 þ ei

ð8Þ

are estimated, where hit þ 1 hit is the change in the depth to groundwater from one year to the next, wit is own-well
pumping, wjt is pumping by neighbors within a speciﬁed radius, and X is a vector of hydrological characteristics and
interaction terms. Eq. (8) estimates this physical relationship between water pumped at various locations and changes in
groundwater depths.
4.2.2. Identiﬁcation strategy for the endogenous behavioral relationship
To investigate the behavioral and economic relationship between neighboring groundwater users, a reduced form
approach is used. We would like to estimate
wit ¼ X0it b þ Zwjt þ eit ,

ð9Þ

the effect of a neighbor’s pumping, wjt, on water extraction by an individual, wit. However, the estimation of neighbors’
interactions, Z, is problematic because of the simultaneity-induced endogeneity bias resulting from each observation being
each other observation’s neighbor so covðwjt , eit Þa0. An identifying assumption is needed to remove the bias, which is
likely to be positive if, as we posit in this paper, there is a strategic interaction between neighboring groundwater users
that leads to overpumping relative to the dynamic optimum. One method that has been used to identify the effect of the
behavior of neighbors on an individuals’ land use choices is to use the physical attributes of neighboring parcels as
instruments for that neighbor’s choices [18,34]. We use a similar strategy, but in addition to using the physical attributes
of neighboring parcels, which are rather homogeneous in this region, we make use of the fact that in Kansas each
groundwater user has an extraction permit that speciﬁes the maximum annual extraction [30]. The permitted amount is
expected to strongly determine the quantity pumped by an individual permit owner, but be uncorrelated with the
pumping decision of the individual’s neighbors. Neighbors’ pumping decisions are determined by their own permitted
amounts. Let a neighbor’s permit amount be cj; if covðwjt ,cj Þa0 (neighbors’ pumping is signiﬁcantly correlated with their
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own permit amount, the ﬁrst stage in the instrumental variables regression), but covðeit ,cj Þ ¼ 0 (neighbors’ permit amounts
are uncorrelated with individual i’s pumping decision, a valid exclusion restriction), then neighbors’ permit amounts can
be used as an instrumental variable for neighbors’ pumping.
We are also interested in investigating the relationship between multiple wells owned by the same individual.
Theoretically, an individual that owns multiple wells in close proximity would internalize any spatial externality that
occurs between them; the elevated pumping levels predicted by the model in response to pumping by neighbors would
not occur if those neighboring wells were owned by the same user. By contrasting the estimated effect of pumping at
neighboring wells owned by others with the effect of pumping at neighboring wells owned by the same individual, we can
measure the effect that is explicitly due to the pumping of others. Because permits are deﬁned at the well level, the same
method of using the permitted quantity at other wells (here, those owned by the same individual) as an instrument for
actual pumping at those wells can be used.
The speciﬁcation of Eq. (9) has additional complications that must be addressed before estimation. First, each individual
has many neighbors. We are interested in the cumulative effect of pumping by all neighbors on an individual’s extraction
decision. We are also interested in the estimation of the (hypothesized) decreasing effect of neighbors’ pumping as the
distance separating them increases. We construct a series of concentric buffers around well i, beyond the largest of which
interaction is not expected to occur. Extraction in the larger buffers is measured exclusively of extraction in the smaller
ones. We then sum the pumping of all neighbors within that buffer. We expect interaction to be the largest at close
distances and the effect to approach zero at the distance increases. Because pumping at the larger buffers is exclusive of
the inner ones, the full effect of pumping in the neighborhood is the sum of the effect in all the buffers.
There is a functional relationship between the distance between wells and the expected effect of pumping by j on
pumping by i, creating spatial dependence [1]. For example, we expect the relationship between pumping by i and j to be
larger if i and j are closer together. Fortunately, we know the nature of the spatial dependence; it is deﬁned by Darcy’s Law,
an equation describing the physical movement of a liquid through a porus material. We weight the (instrumented) effect
of neighbors’ pumping by kj  ðhit hjt Þ=xji , where hit hjt is the difference in lift height in a given time period, kj is
hydroconductivity, and xji is the distance between i and j. These weights adjust the amount pumped by the effect that it
should have. Own pumping at other wells is similarly weighted.
Thus, a series of simultaneous equations explain farmers’ behavior, and can be modeled with a two-step estimation
procedure. First, neighbors’ pumping is predicted as a function of the permitted amount of pumping at that well, an
exogenous well characteristic. Let i ¼ 1, . . . ,N index all the wells in the groundwater basin. For each individual well i, a
neighborhood M is deﬁned. M could potentially include all water users in the aquifer (N). Let j ¼ 1, . . . ,M index wells in the
spatial neighborhood owned by others, and s ¼ 1, . . . ,M index wells in the neighborhood owned by the same individual as
well i. Then the equation
wjt ¼ X0jt b þ acj þ ejt

8 j ¼ 1, . . . ,M

ð10Þ

is the ﬁrst stage regression for neighbors’ pumping, where Xjt is a matrix of individual-well speciﬁc physical characteristics,
including precipitation and soil quality, and cj is a neighbor’s extraction permit amount.
A similar ﬁrst stage regression is used for pumping from wells that are owned by the same individual as well i:
wst ¼ X0st b þ acs þ est

8 s ¼ 1, . . . ,M:

ð11Þ

Here, wst is ‘‘own’’ pumping at other wells, and cs is the quantity permitted for extraction at those wells. Table 6 presents
the results of the ﬁrst stage regression. The extraction permit amount is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of the amount
pumped by an individual.
In the second stage, predicted levels of pumping from Eqs. (10), wnjt , and (11), wnst , are used to estimate the expected
pumping at i using two stage least squares:
wit ¼ X0it b þ aci þ g



M 
M 
X
X
hit hjt
h hst
ks  it
kj 
 wnst þ Z
 wnjt þ mit
xsi
xji
s ¼ 1
j ¼ 1
sai

M  N:

ð12Þ

jai

Xit is a matrix of individual-well speciﬁc regressors that affect the pumping decision including the number of acres
irrigated, rainfall, and soil quality indicators. The weights kj  ðhit hjt Þ=xji come from the equation for Darcy’s Law
describing the movement of a ﬂuid through porous material.11 Again, hit hjt is the difference in lift height in a given time
period, kj is hydroconductivity, and xji is the distance between i and j. These weights adjust the amount pumped by the
effect that it should have. For example, if the distance between two wells is greater, the effect should be smaller. If the
height gradient is larger, the effect should be greater. ci is well i’s permitted allocation of groundwater, and the estimated
coefﬁcient Z measures the effect of the spatial externality. g measures the effect of own pumping at others wells owned by
the same individual.
11
For the estimation, we use the depth to groundwater (h) as a measure of stock, instead of actual stock (the state variable used in the theoretical
section). Thus, yji ðh1 ,h2 , . . . ,hI Þ ¼ yji ðs1 ,s2 , . . . ,sI Þ.
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Table 3
Estimation of the equation of motion (dependent variable: Change in the depth to groundwater from one year to the next (ft)).
(1)
0.5-mile
Amount pumped at i
Amount pumped at other
wells owned by i’s owner
Neighbors’ pumping, 0.5 mi

0.00481
(0.0007)nnn
0.00028
(0.0001)n
0.00146
(0.0008)

Neighbors’ pumping, 1 mile

(2)
1-mile

(3)
2-mile

0.00414
(0.0007)nnn
0.00028
(0.0001)n

0.00311
(0.0007)nnn
0.00027
(0.0001)n

(4)
3-mile

(5)
4-mile

0.00313
(0.0007)nnn
0.00025
(0.0001)n

Precipitationnrecharge

0.00401
(0.0007)nnn
0.00027
(0.0001)n

0.00071
(0.0003)n
0.00051
(0.0002)nn
0.00015
(0.0001)
0.00026
(0.0001)nn
 0.20079
(0.0229)nnn
1.50967
(0.3720)nnn
 0.02598
(0.0118)n

0.00135
(0.0004)nnn

2.24895
(0.5492)nnn
0.00576

0.00059
(0.0001)nnn

Neighbors’ pumping, 4 mile

Potential recharge (in)

0.00211
(0.0008)nn
0.00026
(0.0001)n

0.00093
(0.0001)nnn

Neighbors’ pumping, 3 mile

 0.21190
(0.0229)nnn
1.95678
(0.3678)nnn
 0.03830
(0.0117)nn

 0.20864
(0.0229)nnn
1.85376
(0.3685)nnn
 0.03558
(0.0117)nn

 0.20537
(0.0229)nnn
1.68370
(0.3699)nnn
 0.03084
(0.0118)nn

 0.20642
(0.0229)nnn
1.67688
(0.3705)nnn
 0.03044
(0.0118)nn

0.00052
(0.0001)nnn
 0.20533
(0.0229)nnn
1.64140
(0.3712)nnn
 0.02924
(0.0118)n

2.93436
(0.5430)nnn
0.00474

2.75866
(0.5441)nnn
0.00504

2.53294
(0.5457)nnn
0.00543

2.56919
(0.5459)nnn
0.00531

2.52101
(0.5467)nnn
0.00533

Hydroconductivity (ft/day)
Hydroconductivityn
neighbors’ pumping, 1 mile
Constant
R2

(7)
1-mile

0.00296
(0.0007)nnn
0.00024
(0.0001)n

0.00163
(0.0003)nnn

Neighbors’ pumping, 2 mile

Precipitation (in)

(6)
Concentric buffers

0.22978
(0.0232)nnn
1.44528
(0.3746)nnn
0.02312
(0.0119)
0.06578
(0.0145)nnn
0.00000
(0.0000)
3.79175
(0.5820)nnn
0.00560

Change in lift height (ft/1000 AF)

Note: n p o 0:05, nn p o 0:01, nnn p o 0:001. Standard errors in parentheses. N is 648,554. All measures of amount pumped are in acre-ft. Neighbors’ pumping
is exclusive of inner radius, i.e., ‘‘Neighbors’ pumping, 4 mile’’ is exclusive of pumping within a radius of 3 mile.

5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
0.0

0.5

1.0

2.0
Distance (miles)

3.0

4.0

Fig. 2. Effects of neighborhood pumping on the change in water table height.

4.3. Results and discussion
Table 3 shows the results from the estimation of Eq. (8), the basic physical relationship between acre-feet that are
pumped from one’s own well and surrounding wells and the change in groundwater lift height. From Table 3, regressions 1
through 5, one hundred acre-feet pumped in one year are associated with an increase in lift height of 0.30 to 0.48 ft at that
same well the following year, depending on the model speciﬁcation. Average pumping at a single well is 144 acre-ft, and
the observed average change in lift height is 1.0 ft, so these estimates are quite reasonable.
Also included is the sum of the acre-feet pumped in increasing distances around i. As expected, the effect is signiﬁcantly
smaller than the effect of own-well pumping, and the effect of neighbor’s pumping decreases as the distance from i
increases. One thousand acre-feet of pumping within a half mile causes an increase in lift height of about 1.5 ft, while one
thousand acre-feet pumped 1–2 mile away is associated with an increase in lift height of 0.9 ft. Fig. 2 illustrates the
decreasing effect; the effect disappears when the distance increases to 3 and 4 miles.12

12
A lag of neighbors’ pumping was included in these regressions; Brozovic et al. [4] argue that it can take a signiﬁcant amount of time for the effect
of pumping in one location to be transmitted to another location. However, for these locations and hydrological conditions the lags were insigniﬁcant, so
were excluded from the ﬁnal model.
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In column 6 of Table 3, measures of hydroconductivity are included. Hydroconductivity is a measure of how well water
ﬂows laterally through an aquifer. Higher levels of hydroconductivity, when interacted with neighbor’s pumping, may be
associated with a greater increase in lift height. However, higher hydroconductivity may also result in more ﬂow through
the aquifer in general, and higher recovery from pumping. The results from the regression appear to support the second
hypothesis. The hydroconductivity variable is signiﬁcant and negative and the interaction term is insigniﬁcant, indicating
that in areas with higher hydroconductivity, the depth to the water table increases less from year to year, all else constant.
Recharge measures the potential for percolation into the aquifer; precipitation measures the amount of water (in
addition to own pumping and subsequent application as irrigation) that is available to recharge the aquifer. Both variables
are expected to decrease the depth to groundwater, although recharge to the aquifer in most parts of the aquifer is very
small. The estimated marginal effect of precipitation is negative and the estimated effect of recharge is negative for slightly
above average levels of precipitation, both as expected.
We expect multiple wells owned by the same person to be managed differently than multiple wells owned by different
people. Just as the optimal extraction rate of a social planner would be lower than that of a group of individuals, the
extraction rate of an individual who owns several wells would be lower than if different people owned each well because
any externalities occurring between wells would be internalized. One way to test this hypothesis is to determine if
pumping from other wells owned by the same person has an effect on the depth to groundwater at location i. It is expected
that a farmer would manage his wells such that the overall level of groundwater beneath his land decreases at whatever he
has determined the optimal extraction path to be. He is more likely to substitute pumping from one well with pumping
from another. Thus, we expect pumping from other wells owned by the same person as the well at location i to have a
smaller effect than pumping from wells owned by neighbors on the depth to groundwater level at i. The estimates
presented in Table 3 conﬁrm this result. The number of acre-feet pumped from wells owned by the same person has an
estimated effect that is smaller in magnitude. An equal amount of groundwater pumped from other wells owned by i has
less than 1/5 the effect of extraction at wells owned by others in a 1-mile radius. While the relationship contains
behavioral implications which have not yet been explicitly estimated, it is evidence that a single owner manages his wells
differently than would multiple owners; this was predicted in the theoretical model.
We note that while the parameter estimates are statistically signiﬁcant, the R2s of the regressions are low. Hydrological
variation and other factors are likely to cause variation in groundwater depth that we do not have the ability to measure. In
addition, while the estimated effects of neighbors’ pumping is small, and may not even be economically important in the
short term (unfortunately, we do not have the data to estimate a pumping cost function), it can still be the source of a
strategic externality. While a pumping cost externality may certainly be important, Negri [27] and Dasgupta and Heal [10]
show that potential capture by neighboring users undermines the incentive to store groundwater as a stock. Moreover,
only the perception of a physical movement of water is necessary for a strategic effect to occur. In reality, typical
groundwater users are unaware of exactly how their neighbors affect them hydrologically. However, the existence of
minimum well spacing requirements, limits on pumping rates, and recognized conﬂicts between users justiﬁes the
perception of movement of water that users may respond to. Users may over- or under-react, and for this reason, an
empirical behavioral response model may be more valuable than a detailed hydrological model to measure interactions
between users.
Given that there is empirical evidence for signiﬁcant lateral ﬂow of water corresponding to the equation of motion, we
expect groundwater users might adjust their behavior in response to the pumping of neighbors. The reduced-form
behavioral model is estimated using Eqs. (10) and (12), and the results are presented in Tables 4 through 6. Table 6 reports
the results of the ﬁrst stage relationship, and shows that the F-statistics for the IV are very high. Table 4 shows the results
of the estimation of Eq. (12), ﬁrst without the weights on neighbors’ pumping (row 1), and second without the instruments
(row 3). These regressions provide an upper bound of the effects of neighbors’ pumping on own pumping, as they do not
correct for spatial gradients or the simultaneity of neighbors’ actions. Table 6 is a test of the instruments, and shows that
neighbors’ pumping is highly correlated with the neighbors’ pumping permits.
The regressions in Tables 5 are estimated with a simultaneous system of equations, using neighbors’ appropriation
contracts as instruments for neighbors’ pumping. Controlling for authorized quantity, precipitation, and soil and
hydrological characteristics, we ﬁnd that the weighted sum of neighbors’ pumping has a signiﬁcant effect on the quantity
of water extracted. The average effect (presented at the bottom of the tables), which is the coefﬁcient on neighbors’
pumping multiplied by the average weight (provided in Table 2), clearly decreases as the neighborhood gets larger (farther
from i). Column 1 of Table 5 uses the weighted sum of the neighbors within 0.5 mile, column 2 all neighbors within 0.5 to
1 mile, column 3 all neighbors within 1 to 2 mile, column 4 all neighbors within 2 to 3 mile, and column 5 all neighbors
within 3 to 4 mile. The average effect shows that, for example, 1000 acre-ft of additional pumping by neighbors within a
half mile radius, at the margin and with the average gradient weight, would cause one to increase their own pumping by
about 12 acre-ft. One thousand acre-ft of pumping by ones’ neighbors within a one mile radius is associated with an
increase in pumping of a similar amount. Fig. 3 shows that at two miles the effect decreases dramatically, nearing zero. The
estimates are signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
Table 4 compares the effects of neighbors’ pumping using several speciﬁcations of the independent variable. The
estimated effects using the instruments (row 5) are about half the magnitude of the estimated effects reported in row 3
that are estimated without the instruments. This is what we would expect; rather than measuring the effect that i and j
simultaneously have on each other, we can isolate the effect of j on i with the instrumental variable approach. Row 2
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Table 4
Summary of the effects of neighbors’ pumping with different speciﬁcations of the independent variable.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Neighbors’ pumping (unweighted, no IV)
Neighbors’ pumping (weighted,a no IV)
Average effectb (weighted, no IV)
Neighbors’ pumping (weighted, with IV)c
Average effect (weighted, with IV)

0.5 mile

1 mile

2 mile

3 mile

4 mile

0.0619
0.0004
0.0287
0.00015
0.0116

0.0553
0.0004
0.0178
0.00025
0.0126

0.0306
0.0003
0.0065
8.63e  05
0.0024

0.0228
0.0002
0.0033
4.90e  05
0.0010

0.0193
0.0002
0.0027
3.09e  05
0.0005

Note: n p o 0:05, nn p o 0:01, nnn p o 0:001. N is 59,800.
a
Neighbors’ pumping is a weighted sum, absolute value of the weights.
b
Average effect¼ beta on neighbors’ pumpingnaverage weight.
c
Estimated coefﬁcient is from the results of the regressions using the instrumental variables, reported in Table 5.

Table 5
Instrumental variables regressions of acre-feet pumped.
(1)
0.5 mile
Pumping at other wells owned by i’s owner
(AF)
Neighbors’ pumping (AF)

Acres planted on irrigable land
Appropriation contract
Precipitation (in)
Potential recharge (in)
Mean slope (%)
Irrigated capability class (dummy)
Available water capacity (cm/cm)
Constant
R2
Test of excluded IVs: Prob 4F
Average neighbor effect
Average own effect

(2)
1 mile

(3)
2 mile

(4)
3 mile

(5)
4 mile

 3.04e  06nnn
(5.38e  07)

6.72e  06nnn
(1.08e  06)

1.39e  05nnn
(2.16e  06)

2.81e  05nnn
(4.33e  06)

5.67e  05nnn
(8.68e  06)

0.000154nnn
(5.49e  05)

0.000252nnn
(2.38e  05)

8.63e  05nnn
(1.07e  05)

4.90e  05nnn
(6.33e  06)

3.09e  05nnn
(4.27e  06)

0.768nnn
(0.00521)
0.111nnn
(0.00261)
 3.748nnn
(0.0813)
4.379nnn
(0.358)
 1.287nnn
(0.397)
 5.021nnn
(0.810)
 432.7nnn
(12.16)
178.8nnn
(2.965)
0.521
0.0000

0.766nnn
(0.00521)
0.110nnn
(0.00261)
 3.726nnn
(0.0813)
4.459nnn
(0.358)
 1.310nnn
(0.397)
 5.078nnn
(0.809)
 436.0nnn
(12.15)
178.5nnn
(2.963)
0.522
0.0000

0.765nnn
(0.00522)
0.109nnn
(0.00261)
 3.716nnn
(0.0814)
4.467nnn
(0.358)
 1.337nnn
(0.397)
 5.058nnn
(0.810)
 438.5nnn
(12.17)
178.6nnn
(2.964)
0.522
0.0000

0.764nnn
(0.00522)
0.109nnn
(0.00261)
 3.709nnn
(0.0814)
4.480nnn
(0.358)
 1.326nnn
(0.397)
 5.018nnn
(0.810)
 440.1nnn
(12.19)
178.6nnn
(2.964)
0.522
0.0000

0.764nnn
(0.00523)
0.109nnn
(0.00261)
 3.707nnn
(0.0815)
4.486nnn
(0.358)
 1.325nnn
(0.397)
 5.020nnn
(0.810)
 439.6nnn
(12.19)
178.4nnn
(2.964)
0.522
0.0000

0.012
0.000

0.013
0.000

0.002
0.000

0.001
0.000

0.001
0.001

Note: n p o 0:05, nn p o 0:01, nnn p o 0:001. N ¼ 58,531. Neighbors’ pumping is a weighted sum, absolute value of the weights, exclusive of pumping in the
smaller radius, i.e., 4 mile radius is exclusive of pumping in 3 mile radius. All pumping amounts are in acre-feet. Standard errors in parentheses. Average
effect is beta on neighbors’ pumping times the average weight.

shows that if we treat all neighbors the same and do not correct for their distance, hydroconductivity, and height gradient,
we greatly overestimate the effect of neighbors’ pumping.
Using the summary statistics presented in Table 2, the average amount of water pumped by neighbors in a one mile
radius is 239 acre-ft (47 acre-ft are within 0.5 mile). Therefore, for the average groundwater extractor, pumping by all
neighbors within one mile would cause him to increase his own pumping by an average of 3.6 acre-ft. Average pumping is
136 acre-ft, so the spatial externality effect of neighbors’ pumping accounts for about 2.5% of total pumping.
Finally, we contrast the behavioral response to extraction by nearby neighbors to extraction from nearby wells that the
owner himself controls. We use the same procedure to instrument for own pumping at other wells using the appropriation
contract at those wells as an instrument to correct for simultaneity, and weight by the hydroconductivity-height-distance
gradient. The average ‘‘own’’ effect (the effect on pumping at i of pumping at other wells owned by the same person) is
presented at the bottom of Table 5. The average own effect is much smaller in magnitude than the effect of pumping by
neighbors. These results indicate that when a farmer controls multiple wells in the same area, he will internalize the
spatial externality caused by pumping at his own nearby wells. He can do this by trading off pumping at one well with
pumping from another, and on average farmers seem to do so in a way that causes a smaller decrease in the water table
level from one year to the next.
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Table 6
First stage relationship between neighbors’ pumping and neighbors’ permit amounts.
Acre-feet pumped
nnn

Permit amount (acre-ft)
Precipitation (in)
Slope (%)
Irrigated capability class ¼1
Water capacity (cm/cm)
Constant
N
F-statistic for instrument
R2
Note: n p o 0:05,

nn

p o 0:01,

0.328
(0.002)
 3.153nnn
(0.075)
 6.144nnn
(0.463)
 7.387nnn
(0.950)
 606.9nnn
(14.123)
259.678nnn
(3.402)
58567
18432.7
0.34

nnn

Acre-feet pumped
0.363nnn
(0.002)

60.87nnn
(0.704)
60150
27101.6
0.31

p o 0:001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Increase in withdrawals (AF)
per 1000 AF
pumped by neighbors

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00
0.5

1.0

2.0
Distance (miles)

3.0

4.0

Fig. 3. Effects of neighborhood pumping on groundwater withdrawals, evaluated at average gradient weight.

5. Conclusion
The inefﬁciencies resulting from the exploitation of common property resources are of continuing concern to
economists, resource managers, and policymakers. In the case of groundwater or other resources where property rights
exist, but may be incomplete because spatial movement of the resource makes it impossible to fully capture what is
technically owned, the measurement of this spatial movement is important because it quantiﬁes the resulting inefﬁciency.
The externalities resulting from groundwater pumping from a common aquifer have been extensively discussed and their
importance debated [10,15,11,27,32,35,26,5,36], but this paper is the ﬁrst to measure them empirically.
We ﬁnd evidence of both a physical movement of groundwater between farms and a behavioral response to this
movement in the agricultural region of western Kansas overlying the High Plains Aquifer, although the estimates of both
are small in magnitude. The movement of water in the aquifer is in response to physical height gradients caused by
groundwater extraction, as well as other hydrological properties that affect groundwater ﬂow. We ﬁnd that 100 acre-ft of
pumping is sufﬁcient to lower the static level of the water table at one’s own well by 0.31 to 0.48 ft, and 1000 acre-ft of
pumping by neighbors within about a two-mile radius can reduce the static level at one’s well by 0.8 to 1.5 ft the following
year. At the average levels of pumping by an individual and his neighbors, this amounts to a reduction in the water table of
0.64 to 1.02 ft per year, about 0.8% of the mean depth to groundwater.13 This is unlikely to be economically signiﬁcant in
any given year, but may be over the life of a well.
In theoretical models, the behavioral response resulting from the inability to completely capture the groundwater to
which property rights are assigned causes some degree of over-extraction. Using an instrumental variable and spatial
weight matrices to overcome estimation difﬁculties resulting from simultaneity, we ﬁnd that on average, the physical

13
Using the estimates of 0.21 to 0.49 ft/100 acre-ft of own pumping, 1.5 ft/1000 acre-ft of neighbors’ pumping within a one mile radius, average own
pumping of 136 acre-ft, average one mile radius pumping of 239 acre-ft, and average depth to groundwater of 114 ft.
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connectivity and behavioral feedback effects that cause the spatial externality result in over-extraction that accounts for
about 2.5% of total pumping. Kansas farmers would apply 2.5 percent less water in the absence of spatial externalities (if,
as an unrealistic example, each farmer had an unpenetrable tank of water that held his or her portion of the aquifer).
Strengthening the evidence of the behavioral response to the spatial externalities caused by the movement of
groundwater is the empirical result that when a farmer owns multiple wells, he does not respond to pumping at his own
wells in the same manner as he responds to pumping at neighboring wells owned by others. In fact, the response to
pumping at his own wells is to marginally decrease pumping, thus trading off the decrease in water levels between spatial
areas and internalizing the externality that exists between his own wells.
Policy options to reduce the inefﬁciency caused by the spatial movement of water in the aquifer are relatively limited
because the inefﬁciency is caused by physical movement. Libecap and Wiggins [22] argue that unitization and contracting
between neighbors should occur naturally; landowners most affected by pumping from their neighbors would buy up
neighboring land to reduce the movement out of their land. Our results indicate that this would be effective; water
pumped from wells owned by the same person does not have the same effect as an equal amount of water pumped by
neighboring landowners due to management by the landowner (the internalization of the externality). Moreover, the
externalities are concentrated in space; the effect of neighbors’ pumping decreases to nearly zero at distances of three to
four miles.
These results also suggest that the minimum spacing requirements for new wells are necessary, but they may not be
sufﬁciently large to entirely prevent interaction. While current regulations vary by groundwater management district and
the size of the well and level of extraction, minimum spacing requirements are rarely larger than one-half mile. Our results
show that irrigation pumping affects other wells between seasons at distances of up to one mile. Additionally, the
regulations do not have any effect on the nearly 20,000 existing wells with active extraction permits. Given the small
number of new extraction permits approved each year, distance-weighted reductions in the annual pumping limit for
wells that are within one mile of each other would be more effective in reducing the effect of spatial externalities,
especially in areas where irrigation wells are dense and the effects of neighbors pumping is higher than average. However,
the costs of such a regulation should be compared to the beneﬁts, as we ﬁnd that spatial externalities account for a very
small proportion of total extraction.
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